


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## STAFF NOTES:

# Soviet Union Eastern Europe

**Top Secret**

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May 28, 1975  
SC No. 00435/75

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## **SOVIET UNION - EASTERN EUROPE**

This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington community by the USSR - Eastern Europe Division, Office of Current Intelligence, with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to the authors of the individual articles.

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Romanian Views on CEMA

The Romanians are again digging in their heels against what they anticipate will be new Soviet efforts to speed the pace of economic integration in CEMA.

The harsh tone of two authoritative articles in the party newspaper and theoretical journal strongly suggests that Ceausescu has ordered a spirited and lengthy public polemic prior to the CEMA summit meeting reportedly scheduled for next month in Budapest or Moscow. The articles surfaced on May 20, the day that the eighth session of the Romanian-Soviet Inter-governmental Commission for Economic Collaboration opened in Moscow.

Although it has almost become a Romanian custom to launch a campaign against integration in advance of a CEMA summit, the US embassy in Bucharest notes--and we agree--that this year's offerings show a sharper tone than a similar effort before last year's CEMA summit in Sofia.

The articles almost certainly reflect increased Soviet-Romanian differences over issues that range from Bucharest's obstructionist tactics in the preparations for a conference of European Communist parties to the recently concluded US-Romanian trade agreement. These and other Ceausescu initiatives are designed to undercut Soviet efforts to tighten control over East Europe.

The articles suggest that Ceausescu believes Soviet or other loyalist CEMA planners are trying to lay the theoretical groundwork to push all CEMA members into a comprehensive program of integration that will dilute national independence and sovereignty. This argument against supra-nationalism has its

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antecedents in Romania's so-called "declaration of independence" of April 1964, but this year it is augmented by references to the new Romanian party program and by frequent citations of Marx and Lenin.

In what amounts to a demand for eventual parity in the level of industrial development among CEMA members, one article asserts that Marx himself stressed that the entire internal structure of a country "depends on the level of development of its production and of its domestic and foreign relations." The writer also quotes Marx as saying that socialist relations are based "not on exploitation, but on productive work." The companion article attacks "some authors," who propose a form of economic integration that would eventually lead to a "single international process of production into which the national economies of participating countries allegedly would dissolve, thereby gradually losing their identity."

The articles, in typical Romanian fashion, nowhere flatly state that either CEMA or Moscow plans to call for such complete integration at the coming CEMA summit. Ceausescu does, however, fear that the Soviets will attempt to inhibit Romanian foreign policy initiatives by tying his country's economy more closely to the East. Ceausescu--like his predecessor, Gheorghiu-Dej--has long believed that Romania's freedom of maneuver in the international arena essentially flows from the country's relatively rich raw materials base, a factor that makes Bucharest less vulnerable to pressure from the Kremlin. (CONFIDENTIAL)

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**TOP SECRET UMBRA**

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Soviet Republic Election Campaign Launched


Politburo member Kunayev and candidate member Romanov opened the leadership's campaign for re-election to republic Supreme Soviets with reports this week to their constituencies in Kazakhstan and Leningrad. Other Kremlin leaders--speaking roughly in ascending order of their rank--will make similar presentations over the next three weeks. General Secretary Brezhnev is expected to make the final speech shortly before the elections scheduled for June 15.

The speeches are not meant to attract votes, but they do provide an opportunity for leaders to air their individual views--albeit cautiously--and to gain support for them.

The top leaders are customarily nominated for more than one seat in a republic parliament, and the number garnered also sheds light on the individual's political standing.

As he did in last year's nominations for the USSR Supreme Soviet, Brezhnev clearly led the field, and the other rankings showed no significant change.  
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Soviet Computer Production Registers Sharp Upturn

The high priority given the computer equipment industry in the USSR's current plan period finally appears to be paying off. According to official data, the value of output of computers, calculators, accounting and business machines in March increased by a whopping 51 percent compared with the corresponding month in 1974. For the first quarter of 1975, output was up by 39 percent over the first quarter of 1974. Should growth in output for the rest of the year be maintained at the first quarter rate, the level of output will reach 3.1 billion rubles and exceed the original Five Year Plan goal by more than one half.

Reasons for the sudden sharp rise in the rate of growth are not immediately obvious. There is no evidence that new facilities to produce computers have been built or that any existing production facilities have been expanded significantly. The increased value of output can possibly be explained by discontinuance of some old models and expanded production of newer third-generation machines that carry higher price tags. Newer machines that are being produced in larger volume include: general purpose machines such as RYAD-20, RYAD-30 and M-4030; the NAIRI-3-1 scientific computer; and the M-6000 industrial process control computer. (CONFIDENTIAL)

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